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### 'Light is *letting-through*': reading M. John Harrison's *Light* and Heidegger's *The Essence of Truth*

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**'Light is *letting-through*': reading M. John Harrison's  
*Light* and Heidegger's *The Essence of Truth***

James Holden

In this essay I want to offer a reading of a key contemporary science-fiction novel, M. John Harrison's *Light* (2002). More specifically, I want to focus on the many descriptions of light and enlightenment in this text. These beautiful passages form an integral part of the plot – they are part of both its speculation on quantum computation and its depiction of a peculiar galactic landscape. They also reflect back upon the psychology of the protagonists that occupy this space. There is, though, more than simple story-telling going on in these sections. This science-fiction novel cannot help but draw upon a tradition of similar images of light in literature, philosophy and religion. In the following argument I want to read the text against the grain by exploring the extent to which its images can be read alongside, against and through the analysis of light provided by Martin Heidegger in his work *The Essence of Truth* (delivered as a series of lectures, winter semester 1930-1931; first published 1988) and elsewhere.

In doing so I will be working in an important emerging terrain in science-fiction criticism. Despite its formidable difficulty, Heidegger's philosophy has, in the last few years at least, proved to be an invaluable tool for critics of the genre. For instance, it provides Roger Luckhurst with a key reference point in his exploration of 'the technocultural conjuncture' of the mid 1940s in his far-reaching work *Science Fiction* (2005).<sup>1</sup> For the science-fiction author and academic Adam Roberts, Heidegger's thought plays an even more vital role. In his book *The History of Science Fiction* (2006) he goes so far as to argue that *any*

criticism of science fiction must begin with the German philosopher: 'Heidegger ... represents the best starting-point for a thoroughgoing theorisation of "science fiction"'.<sup>2</sup> If one attempts this theorisation, Roberts suggests, it is necessary to re-read the label science fiction or 'SF' itself in Heideggerean terms: 'My conclusion is that SF is better defined as "technology fiction" provided we take "technology" not as a synonym for "gadgetry" but in a Heideggerean sense as a mode of "enframing" the world, a manifestation of a fundamentally philosophical outlook'.<sup>3</sup>

In this essay, then, I will be using a text by Heidegger – namely, *The Essence of Truth* – to make different kinds of sense of one key contemporary example of the genre Roberts calls 'technology fiction'.

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At the beginning of *The Essence of Truth* Heidegger asks a question with far-reaching philosophical implications: "'Truth": what is that?'.<sup>4</sup> This, then, is the problem that he seeks to address in his course.<sup>5</sup> His immediate response to it is to list, in a surprisingly light-hearted way, several known 'truths', including the fact 'that Kant is a philosopher, that it is noisy on the street outside, [and] that this lecture room is heated' (ET, 1). It does not take Heidegger long to discover how and in what way these seemingly random statements are 'truths': 'what they say corresponds with the facts *about which* they say something' (ET, 2). Having realised this he offers the following all-encompassing definition: 'Truth is correctness [*Richtigkeit*]. So truth is *correspondence, grounded in correctness, between proposition and thing*' (ET, 2).

For Heidegger, this explanation is 'self-evident' (ET, 2). However, it is precisely this easy self-evidence that seems to make him suspicious of it. He asks: 'Is what we have just called "self-evident" (truth as correspondence and correctness, essence as the universal, the what-being) really intelligible?' (ET, 2). His subsequent reading of the

definition proves that this is in fact *not* the case: 'Now, already after a few crude steps, this [definition's] self-evidence has emerged as thoroughly incomprehensible' (ET, 5). In order to set himself on a surer critical path he therefore looks to 'the way in which truth was *earlier* conceived ... the history of the concept of truth' (ET, 5). After a slightly stuttering start, and in what amount to a typically Heideggerean move, he eventually considers ancient culture and the beginnings of philosophy itself. Here, he discovers a crucial fact: 'The Greek word for truth – one can hardly remind oneself of this too often – is ἀλήθεια, *unhiddenness* [*Unverborgenheit*]. Something true is ἀλήθές, unhidden' (ET, 7).

This proves to be an important etymological link and is one that he would indeed remind us of often. For instance, it forms an important part of his argument in 'The Question Concerning Technology' (1953). In this essay Heidegger writes: 'The Greeks have the word *alētheia* for revealing. The Romans translate this with *veritas*. We say "truth" and usually understand it as correctness of representation'.<sup>6</sup>

The relationship between the earlier notion of ἀλήθεια and our everyday concept of truth is, almost inevitably, problematic in Heidegger's eyes. As he puts it in *The Essence of Truth*: 'Truth as unhiddenness and truth as correctness are quite different things; they arise from quite different fundamental experiences and cannot at all be equated' (ET, 8). Significantly, he goes on to argue that in ancient culture 'the idea of unhiddenness was given up' (ET, 10). As far as he is concerned, 'in Aristotle and Plato we can see how the indicated fundamental experience has already begun to be ineffective' (ET, 12). It is with the intention of exploring this turn that Heidegger launches into a highly responsive reading of one of the most famous moments in all philosophy: 'In order to further investigate this *transition* ... we wish to consider a reflection of Plato's treating of ἀλήθεια ... the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII of the work which bears the title Πολιτεία, and which we miscomprehendingly translate into German as

“Der Staat” (“The Republic”)' (ET, p. 12). It is here, during the course of this analysis, that he produces the reading of light that I want to use to illuminate M. John Harrison's science fiction, or to use Roberts' term, 'technology fiction', novel, *Light*.

Heidegger splits Plato's narrative into four interrelated sections which, in his words, refer 'to the *four stages* of the occurrence [of *alētheia*] as depicted in the allegory' (ET, 17). The first of these, which he labels 'the Situation of Man in the Underground Cave' (ET, 18), encompasses the descriptions of the prisoners in the cave and their relationship with the shadows that move across the wall in front of them.<sup>7</sup> In his initial analysis, Heidegger declares that this passage tells us that 'man already has ... the unhidden' (ET, 20). Such thinking promises to be extremely useful when approaching Harrison's science-fiction novel. After all, here too Man is faced with shadows moving across walls (remember that in Plato's text the prisoners are supposed to represent us all in our daily dealings). I am particularly thinking of the protagonist Michael Kearney in the very first chapter: 'In the street outside – shrugging, wiping one hand quickly and repeatedly across his mouth – he thought he saw a movement, a shadow on the wall, the suggestion of a movement in the orange streetlight'.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps, there is some correspondence here?<sup>9</sup>

Of course, Kearney's position here is *not* really the same as that of the figures in Plato's allegory, or at least as far as Heidegger reconstructs it. In the German philosopher's eyes, these cave-dwelling men 'do ... see the shadows but not as shadows of something ... they do not know anything about a fire which gives off a glow, and in whose luminosity something like shadows can first of all be cast' (ET, 20). This leads them to mistake the Being of what they see: 'They are entirely given over to what they *immediately* encounter' (ET, 20). Harrison's protagonist, Michael Kearney, on the other hand, makes no such mistakes. He certainly knows that what he sees is a shadow; he is perfectly aware that it is the dark space created by the Shrandar, the physically

monstrous being that is haunting or perhaps even hunting him and from which he has been trying to escape his whole life (and who, it later turns out, is actually the last remaining member of an advanced alien race).

This moment under the streetlight is not Kearney's only encounter with the Shranders' shadow. Later, whilst staying in his second wife's flat in London, he catches sight of it again: 'On to the empty white wall above the sofa, in a bright parallelogram of sodium light, something outside was projecting the shadow of an enormous beaked head' (L, 43). Then, when he visits the office of a business contact, it appears once more: 'The first thing Kearney saw outside Meadows's workspace was the shadow of the Shranders, projected somehow from *inside* the building on to one of these. It was life-size, a little blurred and diffuse at first, then hardening and sharpening and turning slowly on its own axis' (L, 131). Such is the terrifying force of this strange being that in these moments its very shadow seems to take on, if not actual *presence* and mass (although even this seems to happen later), then at least a kind of intellectual and emotional weight for Kearney; he tells his first wife Anna: 'Even the shadow of that is more than you can bear to see' (L, 86).

If Michael Kearney is confronted with the Shranders' shadow on a number of occasions, then many of the other characters in the text are also surrounded by shadow beings. This is certainly true of Seria Mau Genlicher, the woman pilot of the sophisticated spaceship known as the '*White Cat*'. This craft, which she is intimately connected to, is in part populated by beings known as 'shadow operators', creatures the narrator only vaguely defines:

What are they? They were algorithms with a life of their own. You found them in vacuum ships like the *White Cat*, in cities, wherever people were. They did the work. Had they always been there in the galaxy, waiting for human beings to take residence?

Aliens who had uploaded themselves into empty space? Ancient computer programs dispossessed by their own hardware, to roam about, half lost, half useful, hoping for someone to look after? (L, 50-51).

Thinking back to the terms that Heidegger uses to analyse Plato's text we might say that these 'shadow operators' are not necessarily shadows of anything – they are ghost-like beings of a sort. Quite what casts them we can, like the novel's impersonal narrator, only guess. However, it does seem somehow significant that in the first reference to these beings in the text they are shown collecting light and reflecting upon themselves. As the ship passes through 'a cloud of non-baryonic junk' we are told that 'the shadow-operators ... gathered by the portholes, arranging the light that fell around them so that they could make the most tragic picture, looking at themselves in mirrors' (L, 8). What, we might ask, is the relationship between this light and the shadows themselves and what part does (self-)reflection play in their Being?

With these questions of light and illumination I would like briefly to return to the opening chapter of the novel. In my discussion I left Kearney under the streetlight facing the Shranders' shadow. The narrator continues: 'Rain, sleet and snow all seemed to be falling at once. In the mix, he [Kearney] thought he saw dozens of small motes of light. Sparks, he thought. Sparks in everything' (L, 3). Now, the 'sparks' that Kearney thinks about might initially be dismissed as the products of dust or pollution in the air. As convincing as this possibility initially sounds it must be discounted when we read on and find the image repeated on numerous occasions. Indeed, the notion that there are 'Sparks in everything' operates as a kind of mantra for the different protagonists in the text. The same phrase passes through Kearney's thoughts again after his arrival on the mysterious planet at the end of the wormhole (L, 297). Similarly Ed Chianese thinks that there are

'sparks in everything' during his escape from the Crays, who are themselves only one manifestation of the Shrandar, in New Venusport (L, 112). And then there is Anna Kearney, who actually gives voice to the phrase in a moment of sexual ecstasy (L, 272). If we are going to understand this seemingly vital image I would argue that it is necessary to understand some of the other meanings that light has in the novel.

There are several moments that I would like to draw attention to in this regard. The first of these is when, in response to a question from his ex-wife Anna, Michael Kearney declares: 'I was thinking that sunlight will transform anything' (L, 66). We might wonder what he means by this. Perhaps he is suggesting that he was pondering the way that sunlight highlights certain surfaces of different objects, seemingly affecting their form, or the way that light can bring out certain shades of colour or even alter them entirely. Then again, maybe he means he was considering the way our responses to things change depending upon the amount of light in which they are bathed. We cannot be sure; at this stage we are really still in the dark.

Perhaps, though, it does not matter what Kearney means here. After all, the novel's narrator immediately informs us that the quantum physicist's answer was a lie: 'Actually he had been thinking how fear transformed things. A glass of mineral water, the hairs on the back of a hand, faces on a downtown street' (L, 66). Now, this is an opinion that Heidegger would have agreed with; or, if not agreed with exactly then certainly have been interested by. After all, the philosopher himself wrote about fear and its effects on our understanding of beings. One key passage in this regard is that chapter of *Being and Time* (1927) where he deals with our 'states-of-mind'. He begins his analysis of these by declaring: 'What we indicate *ontologically* by the term "state-of-mind" is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned'.<sup>10</sup> For Heidegger, such moods or 'attunements', which might seem relatively inconsequential, are actually vitally important for many

reasons, not the least of which being that they affect how we meet objects in-the-world and comport ourselves towards them: '*Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to "bare mood"*'.<sup>11</sup>

Heidegger offers us one key example of this 'disclosive' process here – namely, '*Fear as a Mode of State-of Mind*'.<sup>12</sup> He suggests that '*that in the face of which we fear, the "fearsome"*', is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being'.<sup>13</sup> He then goes on to explain that the very possibility of such an encounter is dependent upon us in some way, on our 'state-of-mind': '*In fearing as such, what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us ... Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind (we call this possibility "fearfulness" ["Furchtsamkeit"]), has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close*'.<sup>14</sup> Finally, Heidegger explains that '*that which fear fears about* is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein'.<sup>15</sup> This is to say that we fear for ourselves (I will return briefly to the notion of *Dasein* later).

If, then, for the protagonist in Harrison's early twenty-first century science-fiction novel 'fear transformed things' (L, 66), it will be clear from the foregoing summary that for the twentieth-century phenomenologist its powers are somewhat more complicated. Nevertheless, I think that there is a connection between their two positions.

Whilst Michael Kearney's thinking about the transformative power of sunlight (L, 66) is initially a little unclear, it is later wholly illuminated. In a passage that is surely designed to mirror the earlier reference to fear,

the narrator describes Kearney's musings whilst he is flying from New York to Heathrow: 'Light will transform anything: a plastic drinking glass full of mineral water, the hairs on the back of your hand, the wing of an airliner thirty thousand feet above the Atlantic. All these things can be redeemed and become for a time essentially themselves' (L, 95). In this, the character's thinking again recalls that of Heidegger. In order to see this we need to turn once more to his reading of Plato's 'cave allegory' in *The Essence of Truth*. I have already explained that he splits this brief narrative into four 'stages'. It is his reading of the third of these that is important here.

The passage that Heidegger refers to as the 'third stage' of the allegory is that in which the prisoner emerges from the cave into the dazzling light of the outside world. Naturally enough, the German philosopher begins his analysis of this movement by turning to Plato's own explanation of it. He summarises this as follows:

The cave, [Plato] says, is the earth under the heavenly dome ... The fire in the cave is the sun, the light of the fire is the sunlight. The shadows are beings, the things we see under the sky and with which we commonly have dealings. We, the prisoners, are bound to self-evidence, and to people who are guided only by this. What is outside the cave ... is the place of the ideas (ET, 33).

For Heidegger, this apparently all-encompassing and authoritative interpretation is unhelpful at best; he declares: 'What all this means we do not know' (ET, 33). In order to make sense of it he therefore makes the following proposition: 'We attempt to get our bearings here by singling out and clarifying the indicated connections and the phenomena to which they refer. We pose four questions' (ET, 34). It is his response to the first of these that I would like to focus on here: 'What is the

interrelation between idea and light?' (ET, 34). Allow me briefly to talk through his analysis.

Heidegger's first move is to think more critically about the role of 'ideas' in the Greek philosopher's text. As he now explains it:

Plato ... say[s] that ... what we should come to know is something *different* from the beings which daily occupy us, i.e. just what the person (the prisoner) who is restricted to the existing things in their infinite variety is *not able* to see. And what is this? The historical interpretation says: it is the *ideas* (ET, 35-36).

To his mind this raises a serious problem; as he puts it: '*what kind* of seeing is this, in which ideas come into view? Obviously it cannot be the seeing of our bodily eyes, for with the latter we see precisely the beings that Plato calls shadows' (ET, 36). In order to make sense of this conundrum Heidegger enters into a strange and often deliberately comic discussion of our senses. Eventually, he reaches the conclusion that 'we would never see anything like a book were we not able to see in another *more primordial* sense. To this latter kind of "seeing" there belongs an *understanding* [*Verstehen*] of what it *is* that one encounters' (ET, 37). As he subsequently reiterates: 'It is through these looks that individual things *present* themselves as this and that, as *being-present*' (ET, 38).

Having established this complex philosophical point Heidegger turns to analyse the next key concept in his question – namely, 'light'. He begins by asking quite simply: "'Light": What is this? And what does it stand for in the allegory?' (ET, 39). After a series of tight theoretical twists and turns he is able to provide the following answer: 'Light ... has the character of going through ... Light is not only what penetrates through, but what *permits* penetration, namely in seeing and viewing. Light is the transparent [*das Durchsichtige*] that spreads out, opens, lets-though' (ET, 40). This is a point that he helpfully reformulates just moments

later, declaring: 'light first lets the object though *to be viewed* as something visible, and also lets-through the view *to* the visible object. Light is what *lets-through*' (ET, 41).

With the meaning of 'idea' and 'light' thus established Heidegger finally sets about clarifying what he calls their 'interrelation' (ET, 34). This he explains as follows: 'What emerged as the essence of light and brightness, namely letting-through for seeing, is precisely the basic accomplishment of the idea' (ET, 42). He subsequently adds: 'Only where being, the what-being of things, is understood, is there a letting-through of beings. Being, the idea, is what lets-through: the *light*. What the idea accomplishes is given in the fundamental nature of light' (ET, 42).

Let's now return to Harrison's science-fiction or, to use Roberts' phrase once more, 'technology-fiction', novel. As we have already seen, the central protagonist Michael Kearney muses at one point: 'Light will transform anything ... All these things can be redeemed and become for a time essentially themselves' (L, 95). In thinking this he presumably means that light is connected with and somehow responsible for Being. From the foregoing summary it will now be clear just how far this repeats Heidegger's analysis, albeit unwittingly. The German philosopher believes that we recognise and understand beings as themselves by sensing the *idea*. It is this, he argues, that is their essence. More to the point, in his thinking it is also light.

Heidegger's explanation of Plato's text might also allow us to make sense of the oft-repeated claim in *Light* that there are 'Sparks in everything' – or at least allow us to make a *different* kind of sense of it as it is already satisfactorily explained by the action of the narrative. When read in the terms of the German philosopher's text, these 'sparks' might just be *ideas*.

In order to develop and complicate my reading I want to turn now to those scenes at the end of Harrison's text that take place on the moon-like world on the other side of the wormhole. Michael Kearney is dramatically transported to this distant celestial object from a beach in America during his last encounter with the Shrandar. Unsurprisingly, he is stunned and overawed by both the violent movement between places and what he finds upon his arrival: 'Kearney opened his eyes. "Too bright," he said. Everything was too bright to see. The light roared in on him unconfined: he felt it on his skin, he heard it as sound. It was light unburdened, light like a substance: real light' (L, 298). If, in his earlier comments on light, Kearney seemed to echo Heidegger's responsive reading of Plato's cave allegory then in this dramatic moment of blindness I would argue that his position mirrors that of the men in the allegory itself, or at least their position so far as the German philosopher represents it. In *The Essence of Truth* Heidegger suggests that in the crucial 'third stage' (see above and ET, 29ff.) of Plato's story 'there occurs a sudden ripping loose' (ET, 32). He then goes on to say: 'At first the eyes [of the former cave-dweller] are dazzled by the brilliance of the sunlight; only slowly do they unaccustom themselves to darkness. Despite the illumination, indeed because of the illumination, the released prisoner initially sees nothing at all of what is now unhidden in the light, and claimed to be unhidden' (ET, 32). Kearney's temporary sightlessness appears to be of the same order as this.

Of course, the connection I have suggested here is only accidental and is incomplete at best. In Harrison's work of 'technology fiction' the blinding brightness that besets the characters can be explained in simple plot terms either as the light from the strange astronomical singularity in the sky above or as that shining from the alien being itself. Later on in the scene, it acquires an altogether different meaning – it becomes associated with religion. When, some time after his arrival, Kearney dies on the moon we are told that 'he saw the raging glory of the light. He felt himself slipping away into it, here in this fabulous place' (L, 300).

The fact that the word 'glory' can mean 'the splendour and bliss of heaven' means that this death scene reads like a kind of ascension.<sup>16</sup> Nor is Kearney alone in experiencing this light in religious terms. Earlier in the novel, whilst describing his initial discovery of the place, the explorer or 'entradista' Billy Anker declares: 'You fall out the wormhole, toppling end over end, all your control systems redlined, and there it is. Light. Deep Light. Fountains, cascades, falling curtains of light. All the colours you can imagine and some you can't' (L, 200). In a strange confusion of the senses, Anker goes on to say: 'I could hear the light pour over me' (L, 200). He finally adds: 'We just hung there in the wash of light' (L, 201). From these passages it would appear that there is something almost baptismal about this 'deep light' for Anker.

Ed Chianese and Seria Mau Genlicher, the two other central protagonists in *Light*, also visit the strange planet at the end of the wormhole and talk with the Shrandar. At one point, and again bathed in light, it informs Ed: 'that's the thing, Ed. Being here. Being up to your neck in what you are' (L, 314). This declaration is positioned as the key philosophical statement of the novel and is one that I think can again be read in Heideggerean terms. If this is done 'being here' might simply be 'Da-*Sein*'. In suggesting this I am thinking of Gregory Fried and Richard Polt's treatment of the word in their recent English version of the philosopher's *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935; first published in German 1953). In their 'Translator's Introduction' they explain that 'it is preferable [when reading Heidegger] to interpret *Dasein* in terms of its root meaning. This root meaning is usually rendered in English as "Being there," but when Heidegger hyphenates *Da-sein*, we have employed the equally valid translation "Being here." *Dasein* is the Being who inhabits a Here'.<sup>17</sup>

The concept of *Dasein* is central to Heidegger's phenomenological project in *Being and Time*. This is, of course, an immense work that I clearly cannot summarise here. Allow me to say, though, that at one

point in this text the philosopher defines his key word as follows: 'Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it'.<sup>18</sup> I would argue that an appreciation of this is vital if we are to gather the full import of the Schröder's declaration, and perhaps even Harrison's work of 'technology fiction' itself.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Roger Luckhurst, *Science Fiction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 87-88.

<sup>2</sup> Adam Roberts, *The History of Science Fiction* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Roberts, *History of Science Fiction*, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 1. Hereafter referred to in the text as ET.

<sup>5</sup> Like all of Heidegger's works, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus* has a complex history. The text's original German editor explains this as follows: 'This volume provides the text of the *first lecture course* entitled "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" delivered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in the winter semester of 1931/32 (from 27 October 1931 to 26 February 1932). These lectures were preceded by a lecture of the same title, first given in 1930 and repeated on several occasions... The same theme was taken up in modified form, with an extensive new introduction, in the winter semester lectures 1933/34'. See Hermann Mörchen, 'Editor's Afterword' in Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, p. 238. For the earlier essay, see Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Truth', trans. John Sallis in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 111-38.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', trans. William Lovitt and David Farrell Krell in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 318.

<sup>7</sup> As Plato's allegory is so famous, and Heidegger's analysis of it so detailed, I will not cite any sections of it here. The reader is referred to Heidegger's work, which includes both the original Greek text and a modern translation. For an alternative translation see, for example, *The Republic* in *The Portable Plato*, ed. Scott Buchanan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1948), pp. 546-49.

<sup>8</sup> M. John Harrison, *Light* (London: Gollancz, 2003), p. 3. Hereafter referred to in the text as L.

<sup>9</sup> I have made this same philosophical connection before. In 'Star' I equated the protagonists of two other science-fiction texts – Arthur C. Clarke's *The City and the Stars* (1956) and Samuel R. Delany's 'Empire Star' (1966) – with the prisoners in Plato's allegory. See 'Star' in James Holden and Simon King, *Conceptual Breakthrough: Two Experiments in SF Criticism* (Ashby-de-la-Zouch: InkerMen Press, 2007), pp. 27-28, 37.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 172.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 177.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger *Being and Time*, p. 179.

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 179.

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 180.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 180.

<sup>16</sup> Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 737.

<sup>17</sup> Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, 'Translator's Introduction' in Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. xii.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 32.