How the Democrats reclaimed populism- and what it means for 2028 and beyond
The Democrats’ success in the 2026 midterms has put economic populism back at the centre of US politics. By focusing on the cost of living, corporate influence and political corruption, candidates have appealed to voters who turned away from Trump. But can this approach unite the party’s progressive and centrist wings, and become the basis of a winning strategy for the 2028 presidential election?
Last week’s US midterm elections saw the Democrats deliver what commentators described as the most emphatic defeat of Donald Trump’s political career (Donald Trump’s Repudiation, America’s Revenge in the Midterms | The New Yorker). The party gained control of both chambers of Congress, capturing Senate seats that Trump and his Republicans won handily just two years ago.
In Texas, Iowa, Ohio, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina and Michigan, voters who backed Trump in 2024 turned decisively against his party. For many, the overriding concern was the soaring cost of living (Young people turned out in near-record numbers for the 2026 midterms, with the economy top of their minds), an issue exacerbated by Trump’s tariff policies and war with Iran. As a result, Vice-President J.D. Vance noted on X, ‘many people who voted for Trump/Vance in 2024 voted for Democrats in 2026.’
Democrats not only made inroads into the Trump coalition (Young voters prefer Dems in midterms, are more disapproving of Trump); their candidates’ rhetoric at times even seemed to copy Trump’s populist playbook, attacking corrupt political elites and promising to put ordinary Americans first. Georgia senator Jon Ossoff condemned the Trump administration as ‘the most corrupt of all time’, whilst Michigan’s Abdul El-Sayed proclaimed himself to be ‘an America First candidate’. In South Carolina, senate candidate Annie Andrews even appeared in an advert standing in a boggy marsh, invoking Trump’s 2016 pledge to ‘drain the swamp’.
Despite populism’s long history in American politics, more recently it has come to be associated with Trump’s xenophobia, denunciations of ‘the deep state’ and nationalist rhetoric. Yet it is not an inherently right-wing phenomenon. Originating in the late-19th century movement against economic privilege and corporate power, populism pits ordinary people against powerful elites- a language the left can deploy as effectively as the right.
For Democrats, this offered a way to turn frustration with Trump into a broader critique of economic and political power. James Talarico, who became the first Democrat to win a Texas senate seat since 1988, argued that ‘the biggest divide in this country isn’t left versus right, its top versus bottom.’ His message connected concerns about Elon Musk’s political donations, the construction of AI datacentres in rural areas and Trump’s use of the presidency to enrich himself and his family (Beyond the blue wave: what the 2026 US midterms say about populism and political change in 2028 | ODI: Think change).
Other candidates adopted similar rhetoric. Andrews attacked ‘Washington insiders, datacentre developers and the same drug and insurance companies that have been ripping us off for years’. El-Sayed’s platform promised ‘Money out of politics, money in your pocket and Medicare For All’. Even more conventional candidates like Ossoff and Ohio’s Sherrod Brown attacked a system that they argued was rigged in favour of large corporations and wealthy individuals.
With Republicans more focused on abstract culture war issues and unable to distance themselves from Trump (Republicans hoping to succeed Trump in 2028 dissect midterm rout | US midterm elections 2026 | The Guardian), Democrats focused on billionaire influence and a political system framed as serving the interests of the wealthy. This critique also extended to foreign policy, with candidates questioning whether America’s overseas commitments served the interests of ordinary voters.
The Iran war gave that argument an immediate economic dimension. With households already struggling with the cost of living, Democrats could point to the conflict’s role in raising fuel and other costs, asking why the administration was committing resources to another Middle Eastern war rather than addressing pressures at home. It also allowed them to reclaim the ‘America First’ language Trump has used previously to criticise foreign entanglements (Abdul El-Sayed’s victory has laid bare a truth about America’s view on Israel | Peter Beinart | The Guardian). Trump and Vance both acknowledged that the war played a key role in the Republicans’ defeat (Trump reacts to Vance’s Iran war post, says he’d make the same call - POLITICO).
The debate over US support for Israel offered another example. El-Sayed attacked the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), arguing that US policy was beholden to foreign lobbying interests rather than serving the American people. He also opposed unconditional military assistance to Israel (Abdul El-Sayed’s victory has laid bare a truth about America’s view on Israel | Peter Beinart | The Guardian). Talarico and Ossoff both pledged not to accept donations from AIPAC and supported defensive military assistance while opposing the sale of American weapons to Israel that could be used on civilians.
Looking ahead to the presidential primaries, a key question will be whether this populist revival will reshape the party’s wider agenda. Bernie Sanders attracted significant support in 2016 and 2020 with a populist message centred on economic inequality and corporate power but ultimately lost both primaries to Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. This ideological division, between the party’s progressive and centrist wings, remains unresolved (Democrats plunge into wide-open 2028 presidential race).
Progressives are likely to point to El-Sayed’s victory in Michigan as evidence that an explicitly anti-establishment, anti-corporate platform can succeed in winning back disaffected working-class voters. More moderate Democrats, meanwhile, can point to candidates like Talarico and Ossoff (already considered a possible front-runner) as proof that a less ideological populist appeal can also succeed. Both wings are likely to claim that the midterms vindicated their approach, setting up a contest over what party the Democrats should become in 2028.
Ultimately the question is whether the Democrats can turn this electoral success into a lasting political realignment (Dozens of Democrats eyeing 2028 presidential run, says former Obama aide - BBC News), making economic populism, rather than simply opposing Trump, the party’s organising principle. The 2028 primary will test whether they have genuinely reclaimed populism from the American right, or merely borrowed its language for an electoral cycle.
Ben Seymour is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University, specialising in the politics of the Middle East, populism and US foreign policy. His doctoral research investigates populist foreign policymaking in times of crisis, focusing on the Turkey-Syria relationship from the 2011 Arab Uprisings to the fall of the Assad regime.